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9 ComUnity Lending, Incorporated

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN JOSE DIVISION

12 In re:

13 COMUNITY LENDING, INCORPORATED, A  
14 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

15 Debtor.

16 5671 Santa Teresa Blvd, Suite 201  
San Jose, CA 95123

17 Employer's Tax ID No.: 94-2673933  
18

Case No. 5:08-CV-00201-JW

Date: April 7, 2008

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Place: United States District Court  
280 S. First Street, Courtroom 8, 4<sup>th</sup> Flr.  
San Jose, CA 95113

Judge: Honorable James Ware

19 **MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF MOTION FOR**  
20 **WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING**  
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1 Defendant and Debtor in Possession ComUnity Lending, Incorporated (the “Defendant”,  
 2 “Debtor” or the “Company”) herein opposes the MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF  
 3 ADVERSARY PROCEEDING (the “Motion”) as follows:

#### 4 I. INTRODUCTION

5 Plaintiffs Mai Christina Pham, John Pham, Mai Nguyen, Hung Perry Nguyen, and Joyce  
 6 Freeman (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) have filed this request to withdraw the automatic reference of the  
 7 adversary proceeding they filed against ComUnity Lending, Inc. (“CLI”, the “Company” or the  
 8 “Debtor”) entitled *Pham, et al., vs ComUnity Lending, Incorporated*, Adv. No. 08-05007-MM (the  
 9 “Adversary Proceeding”) in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California  
 10 (“Bankruptcy Court”). Plaintiffs contend that because the Adversary Proceeding involves  
 11 application of federal non-bankruptcy law affecting interstate commerce and Title 11, withdrawal of  
 12 the reference is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).

13 The district court has original jurisdiction over all cases “arising under” and “related to” the  
 14 Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 *et seq.* (as amended, the “Bankruptcy Code” or “Code”). 28  
 15 U.S.C. § 1334. Although such cases are automatically referred to the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to  
 16 General Order No. 24, the district court may withdraw the reference to the Bankruptcy Court of any  
 17 “case or proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). Withdrawal is required if “the court determines the  
 18 resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United  
 19 States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.” *Id.* Withdrawal of the  
 20 reference may also be permitted “for cause shown.” *Id.*

21 Plaintiffs base their request on their assertion that resolution of their claims requires  
 22 consideration of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and Title 11.  
 23 While district courts have used two different standards in determining whether mandatory  
 24 withdrawal is required, mandatory withdrawal is not required under either standard because the  
 25 resolution of the case does not require the consideration of any substantive ERISA statute or  
 26 provision. Plaintiffs’ claim is based on an alleged failure to make required distributions under a non-  
 27 qualified, unfunded<sup>1</sup>, deferred compensation plan (the “Top Hat Plan”), which is not covered under

28 <sup>1</sup> The Plan was “unfunded” because there was no *res* separate from the corporation's general assets to

1 ERISA's substantive provisions. Instead, the trust document under which the deferred compensation  
 2 was held expressly provides that any rights created under the Top Hat Plan are mere unsecured  
 3 contractual rights of the Top Hat Plan participants and their beneficiaries against the Company.

4 Here, the Debtor contends that payment of the plan benefits cannot be made because the  
 5 express terms of the Top Hat Plan preclude any distribution to plan participants where the Debtor is  
 6 insolvent.<sup>2</sup> The Plaintiffs argue, among other things, that the Debtor was solvent as of the date of  
 7 the termination of the plan and that these funds can therefore be distributed to the participants ahead  
 8 of general creditors even though the Company is now a debtor in a bankruptcy case, contending that  
 9 the Debtor holds these funds in trust. Resolution of this issue does not necessitate consideration of  
 10 any ERISA statute; it is a question of contractual interpretation as set forth above.

11 Discretionary withdrawal of the reference is also not appropriate. Plaintiffs contend that the  
 12 funds are not the property of the Bankruptcy Estate and that the Defendant is seeking to "evade"  
 13 prior orders of this Court pursuant to which the Court issued a writ of attachment to protect the funds  
 14 from the reach of other creditors while the matter was pending. However, the filing of the Chapter  
 15 11 case in fact is consistent with the purpose of protecting the funds from the reach of creditors by  
 16 the imposition of the automatic stay. Indeed, the parties have stipulated that the funds in question  
 17 remain segregated in separate debtor-in-possession accounts pending further order of the Bankruptcy  
 18 Court. Further, whether the funds are property of the estate is clearly a core bankruptcy issue of  
 19 which the Bankruptcy Court is capable of hearing and in light of its administration of the estate,  
 20 should be hearing. Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to claims in the bankruptcy estate and if so, the  
 21 extent of any priority, are also matters within the core jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. The  
 22 Bankruptcy Court routinely hears matters similar to those presented by the Plaintiffs here, there are a  
 23 multitude of bankruptcy issues regarding the nature of the claims and the Bankruptcy Court provides

24 which the participants could look to satisfy their claims, (2) the participants' rights to the corporation's assets  
 25 were no greater than the rights of general, unsecured creditors, and (3) the participants did not pay taxes on  
 the deferred compensation. *Accardi v. IT Litig. Trust (In re IT Group, Inc.)*, 448 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 2006)

26 <sup>2</sup> Indeed, the Trust had to contain these terms to retain the "unfunded" status of the Top Hat Plan.  
 27 "An employer may set aside deferred compensation amounts in a segregated fund or trust without  
 28 jeopardizing a plan's 'unfunded' status if the fund or trust remains 'subject to the claims of the employer's  
 creditors in the event of insolvency or bankruptcy.' [citation omitted]." *Accardi v. IT Litig. Trust (In re IT*  
*Group, Inc.)*, 448 F.3d 661, 665 (3d Cir. 2006)

1 a competent forum to resolve the issues. The Motion should be denied.

## 2 II. FACTS<sup>3</sup>

3 1. On January 4, 2008 the Debtor filed its Voluntary Petition under Chapter 11 bearing  
4 case number 08-50030 (the "Chapter 11 Case"). The Debtor is a debtor in possession pursuant to  
5 sections 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.

6 2. CLI is a mortgage lender incorporated in 1980 and is an S-Corporation owned by W.  
7 Darryl Fry as the sole shareholder. Historically, CLI was in the business of originating, brokering,  
8 servicing and selling residential mortgages. CLI received periodic origination fees for originating  
9 loans and management fees for servicing loans. In addition, CLI obtained and sold real-estate  
10 owned ("REO") properties acquired through foreclosure upon borrower defaults. At present, CLI  
11 has ceased all loan origination operations and is in the process of selling its remaining loans and  
12 REO properties, completing foreclosures and liquidating all of its other assets.

13 3. As part of its original business, CLI would originate and fund loans via various short  
14 term warehouse lines of credit (the "Warehouse Credit Facilities") from various financial institutions  
15 including, among others, First Collateral Services, Washington Mutual, Greenwich and GMAC –  
16 RFC. After originating and funding loans, CLI sold substantially all originated and funded loans  
17 (the "Loan Sales") to various investors, including, among others, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch,  
18 IndyMac and Countrywide Home Loans (collectively, the "Investors"). The Loan Sales enabled the  
19 Company to service the various Warehouse Credit Facilities so that the Debtor could fund additional  
20 loans. Additionally, certain of the Investors would bundle the purchased loans and issue securities,  
21 backed by these loans and mortgages, to private third-party investors. In the event of loan defaults  
22 or delinquencies and/or upon the occurrence of other conditions, subject to the terms of the  
23 applicable Loan Sales' documents, the Investors could require CLI to repurchase said loans (the  
24 "Repurchase Requests").

25 4. CLI began to experience the effects of the country-wide mortgage crisis in the spring  
26 of 2007. CLI's outstanding Repurchase Request obligations continued to increase and peaked in the

27 <sup>3</sup> The factual statements herein are supported by the DECLARATION OF RICHARD COUCH IN  
28 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO WITHDRAW REFERENCE and the DECLARATION OF JANENE TOWNER IN  
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO WITHDRAW REFERENCE, filed concurrently herewith.

1 July to September 2007 timeframe. This caused a situation whereby CLI could no longer service its  
 2 debt. In addition, CLI was served and named in multiple legal actions, including actions by  
 3 borrowers, equipment lessors, vendors, and prior employees during the same period. As a result of  
 4 the mounting pressures and obligations, CLI was forced to seek a crisis management specialist to  
 5 address these issues, fully terminate operations and to liquidate the company. CLI entered into  
 6 discussions with Diablo Management Group (“DMG”), of which Richard Couch is the founder and  
 7 Chairman, to assist in the restructuring, management, and potential liquidation of CLI. On October  
 8 25, 2007, the CLI Board of Directors passed a series of resolutions to, among other things, retain  
 9 DMG and to appoint Richard Couch as CLI’s Chief Executive Officer and board member.  
 10 Concurrently therewith, all other officers and directors of CLI resigned and DMG assumed  
 11 responsibility for all day to day operations of CLI.

12 5. The Debtor filed the Chapter 11 Case to preserve its remaining assets so that their  
 13 value may be maximized by the Debtor for the benefit of all of its creditors. The Debtor intends to  
 14 orderly wind down its business, recover and preserve its assets and propose a liquidating plan of  
 15 reorganization.

16 6. Plaintiffs are former employees of CLI and participants in the Top Hat Plan.

17 7. The present Top Hat Plan was commenced in 2001 and was restated in 2003. It is  
 18 governed by the terms of the Top Hat Plan<sup>4</sup> and Transamerica Investment Services served as the  
 19 plan administrator (the “Plan Administrator”). The Debtor believes that the plan benefits were held  
 20 in trust pursuant to a Trust Agreement dated September 1, 2003 (“Trust”)<sup>5</sup>, of which Plaintiffs were  
 21 third-party beneficiaries.

22 8. Section 1(d) of the Trust states: “. . . Any rights created under the Plan and this Trust  
 23 Agreement shall be mere unsecured contractual rights of Plan participants and their beneficiaries  
 24 against Employer. Any assets held by the Trust will be subject to the claims of the Employer’s  
 25

26 <sup>4</sup> A copy of the Top Hat Plan is attached as Exhibit 1 to the VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF  
 27 CONTRACT, DECLARATORY RELIEF, AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (the “Complaint”) filed Jan. 7, 2008 by the  
 Plaintiffs in this action. All references to the Top Hat Plan are to the Plaintiffs’ exhibit as presented.

28 <sup>5</sup> The Trust Agreement is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Complaint for Breach of Contract, Declaratory  
 Relief, and Injunctive Relief, filed Jan. 7, 2008. All references to the Trust are to the Plaintiffs’ exhibit as  
 presented.



1 general creditors under federal and state law in the event of Insolvency, as defined in Section 3(a).”  
 2 Section 3(a) defined “Insolvency” as the Company being unable to pay its debts as they became due  
 3 or the Company becoming a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

4 9. The Top Hat Plan set forth similar language in describing the funds contributed by the  
 5 Top Hat Plan participants. Thus, the recitals specify that it is the express intent of the Employer that  
 6 the assets of the Plan and Trust shall at all times be subject to the claims of the general creditors of  
 7 the Employer.

8 10. Section 5.2 of the Top Hat Plan provides that **"all amounts under this Plan...shall**  
 9 **remain (until made available to the Participant or Beneficiary) solely the property of the**  
 10 **Employer (without being restricted to the provision of benefits under the Plan) subject to the**  
 11 **claims of the Employer's general creditors. No Participant or Beneficiary shall have any**  
 12 **secured or beneficial interest in any property, rights or investments held by the Employer in**  
 13 **connection with the Plan."**(Emphasis added).

14 11. Section 10.6 of the Top Hat Plan provides that the **"vested Account balance of a**  
 15 **Participant shall be paid from the Trust only to the extent the Employer is not at the time of**  
 16 **payment insolvent. Any vested accrued benefits under the Plan represent an unfunded,**  
 17 **unsecured promise by the Employer to pay these benefits to the Participants when due. A**  
 18 Participant has no greater right to Trust assets than the general creditors of the Employer in the event  
 19 that the Employer shall become insolvent. Trust assets can be used to pay only vested accrued  
 20 benefits under the Plan or the claims of the Employer's general creditors." (Emphasis added).

21 12. On or about September 4, 2007, the Company purported to terminate the Top Hat  
 22 Plan. As was apparently normal practice, the Plan Administrator issued checks to ComUnity in the  
 23 amount of each participant's vested account (the "Top Hat Funds") for ultimate distribution, less  
 24 applicable withholding taxes, to the plan participants, including the Plaintiffs.<sup>6</sup> Plaintiffs contend,

25 <sup>6</sup> Plaintiffs apparently think that it is advantageous to them to ascribe improper motives to the  
 26 Company's management without any evidence, claiming that the Company "forged" depository instructions  
 27 from the Plaintiffs to divert the Top Hat Funds to the Company. As set forth in the DECLARATION OF  
 28 RICHARD COUCH IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING, the Debtor  
 believes that the Plan Administrator's normal practice in making distribution of plan benefits was to issue  
 checks payable to ComUnity who in turn would deduct applicable withholding amounts for taxes and issue a  
 net check to the participant. The evidence will show that the Company did not "forge" any document, it

1 among other things, that the Plan was terminated earlier by the decision of the Board to terminate the  
 2 Top Hat Plan in a meeting held on August 10, 2007 and that upon termination, the Top Hat Plan  
 3 provided that plan benefits be paid immediately to the participants.

4 13. Following the purported termination of the Plan, and due to the events overtaking the  
 5 Company at this time as described above, the prior management of the Company determined that it  
 6 could not make the distribution of the Top Hat Funds pending a determination of the Company's  
 7 solvency, in light of the Company's then present financial condition. The Company placed all but  
 8 \$227,000 of the Top Hat Funds in a separate, segregated interest bearing account, pending further  
 9 investigation and counsel. DMG has maintained the Top Hat Funds, including the \$227,000 in funds  
 10 referred to above, in two separated segregated accounts since it assumed fiduciary responsibility for  
 11 the Company so that the status quo was maintained pending a resolution.

12 14. Plaintiffs filed their action in District Court and on December 6, 2007, the District  
 13 Court entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs' Application for a Writ of Attachment. Plaintiffs effected  
 14 the levy of the Writ of Attachment on December 28, 2007. On January 4, 2008, CLI filed the  
 15 Chapter 11 Case.

### 16 III. ARGUMENT

17 District courts are vested with jurisdiction over every case commenced under the Bankruptcy  
 18 Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Pursuant to General Order No. 24, such cases are automatically referred to  
 19 the bankruptcy court within the same judicial district. Section 157(d) states:

20 The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or  
 21 proceeding referred under this section, on its motion or on timely  
 22 motion of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on  
 23 timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court  
 determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of  
 both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating  
 organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.

24 The section provides two bases for withdrawal, discretionary withdrawal for cause and  
 25 mandatory withdrawal. The Motion should be denied. Mandatory withdrawal is not applicable as  
 26

27 simply indicated that the check should be issued to the Company in accordance with this normal procedure  
 28 and a Company officer put her initials verifying this practice on some of the depository instructions submitted  
 to the Plan Administrator. See the DECLARATION OF JANENE TOWNER IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO  
 WITHDRAW REFERENCE, filed concurrently herewith.

the proceeding does not require the consideration of ERISA or any other law of the United States affecting interstate commerce. Further, Plaintiffs have not shown cause to warrant discretionary withdrawal.

**a. Mandatory Withdrawal of the Reference is not Required.**

Section 157(d) has two requisites for mandatory withdrawal: consideration of title 11 and consideration of other laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce. See *1 Collier on Bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Courts, Jurisdiction, Venue, Appeals, General Coverage* 3.04[2] (“Collier”). While there is a split amongst district courts in other circuits in interpreting this statute, the prevalent interpretation before invoking mandatory withdrawal is to require a “substantial and material consideration of” non-Code statutes and to have more than a *de minimus* effect on interstate commerce. See Collier ¶ 3.04[2].

The Seventh Circuit has stated that:

Overwhelmingly courts and commentators agree that the mandatory withdrawal provision cannot be given its broadest literal reading, for sending every proceeding that required passing “consideration” of non-bankruptcy law back to the district court would “eviscerate much of the work of the bankruptcy courts[.]” From a litigant’s perspective, such a reading would also create an “escape hatch” by which bankruptcy matters could easily be removed to the district court.

*In re Vicars Ins. Agency*, 96 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 1996).

There is significant support for the “substantial and material” requirement in the Ninth Circuit. See, *Security Farms v. Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters*, 124 F.3d 999, 1008 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) (“By contrast [to mandatory withdrawal], permissive withdrawal does not hinge on the presence of substantial and material questions of federal law.”); *In re The Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego*, Case No. 07cv1355-IEG(RBB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60954, \*5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2007) (citing *In re Vicars* as legal standard); *Don’s Making Money, LLP v. Estate of Deihl*, Case No. CV 07-319-PHX-MHM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32972, \*5-\*7 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2007) (citing *Security Farms* and *In re Vicars*); *Stratton v. Garcia*, Case No. CIV-F-06-1495 AW1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14434, \*4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (citing *In re Vicars* as legal standard); (requiring substantial and material consideration of federal statutes).

1 Indeed, this Court has previously considered the issue and held:

2 “The mandatory withdrawal provision of § 157(d) is to be  
3 construed narrowly, so that it does not become an ‘escape hatch’ for  
4 matters properly before the bankruptcy court.” Mandatory withdrawal  
5 is warranted under Section 157 when “substantial and material  
6 consideration” of federal statutes is necessary for the resolution of the  
7 issue.

8 *In re General Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 890*, Case No. C 94-20623 JW,  
9 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21620 at \*10-11 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“*In re General Teamsters*”).

10 The other line of interpretation, where the statute is broadly applied, is a position taken by a  
11 minority of courts. See, *In re Keifer*, 276 B.R. 196, 200 (E.D. Mich. 2002); *Martin v. Friedman*, 133  
12 B.R. 609, 612 (N.D. Ohio 1991); but see, *Chao v. Holman (In re Holman)*, 325 B.R. 569, 573 (E.D.  
13 Ky. 2005) (“Although [*Kiefer*] has rejected this test, since the majority of jurisdictions within this  
14 Circuit, and elsewhere, have adopted the substantial and material consideration test, this Court will  
15 also adopt the substantial and material consideration test.”).

16 In any event, under either test, mandatory withdrawal is not applicable. It is plain that the  
17 subject case does not require consideration of any of the substantive provisions of ERISA because  
18 the Top Hat Plan by its very terms and definition does not come within ERISA’s substantive  
19 provisions.

20 While ERISA does involve interstate commerce, (see generally, *In re White Motor Corp.*, 42  
21 B.R. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1984)), “top hat” plans are special breed of plans that were excluded from  
22 substantive portions of ERISA, pursuant to 29 USCS § 1051(2). They allow employees to defer  
23 more of their income for tax advantages; however, the plan has to have certain provisions to so  
24 qualify, including the provision that the deferred compensation contributions are general assets of  
25 the employer. Thus, if the plan fits the “top hat” exclusion, ERISA does not impose a trust on the  
26 plan's funds, and Bankruptcy Code does not exclude property in “top hat” plan from the debtor  
27 employer's bankruptcy estate. *IT Group, Inc. v Bookspan (In re IT Group, Inc.)* 448 F3d 661, 664  
28 (3d Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs cannot seriously contest the fact that the Top Hat Plan here is a “top hat” plan  
excluded from the substantive portions of ERISA. Plaintiffs have not identified any specific ERISA

1 provisions that require consideration, significant, material or otherwise, to resolve the issues  
2 presented by their Complaint.

3 Instead, the Plaintiffs note that “[s]ubstantial legal questions that a court may need to  
4 determine include, without limitation, the scope of ERISA’s preemption of related state-law claims,  
5 the duties of an employer administering a top-hat plan under ERISA, and the remedies available to  
6 Plaintiffs.” However, Plaintiffs overstate the impact and judicial interpretation of ERISA required in  
7 this case and any interpretation of Plaintiffs’ rights under ERISA only requires a straightforward  
8 application of the law to the facts and can be determined by a bankruptcy court.

9 Plaintiffs state as a basis for relief that there existed a “Trust Agreement” and they are the  
10 “beneficiaries” of such trusts. See VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, DECLARATORY  
11 RELIEF, AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, *Pham et al. v. ComUnity Lending, Inc.*, Case No. 08-50030,  
12 paragraphs 48-56 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008). 29 USC § 1101(a)(1) states that those provisions  
13 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.) that describe fiduciary duties under an ERISA plan shall apply  
14 to any plan other than “a plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an employer for the purpose  
15 of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated  
16 employees.” There is no disagreement that this is an unfunded deferred compensation plan for  
17 management or highly compensated employees. Indeed, the Trust document specifically states in  
18 recital (e) that

19 “Whereas, it is the intention of the parties that this Trust shall  
20 constitute an unfunded arrangement and shall not affect the status of  
21 the Plan as an unfunded plan maintained for the purpose of providing  
22 deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly  
23 compensated employees for purposes of Title I of the Employee  
24 Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,”

25 Consequently, the trustee has no federal fiduciary duty under ERISA based on a  
26 straightforward application of federal statute to the trust.

27 Thus, although a “trust” has been established, the rights under ERISA are limited for “top  
28 hat” plans as the funds in such trusts are recognized to be unfunded and at risk to creditors. In *In re*  
*IT Group, Inc.*, the Third Circuit notes that one commonly-used mechanism for top hat plans is the  
“rabbi trust” which is:

1 [a]n irrevocable trust for deferred compensation. Funds held  
2 by the trust are out of reach of the employer, but are subject to the  
3 claims of the employer's creditors in the event of bankruptcy or  
4 insolvency.

5 The rabbi trust gives employees some measure of security,  
6 while at the same time deferring taxes. The assets set aside in the trust  
7 are segregated from the employer's other assets and can be used only  
8 to pay the deferred compensation. If there is a change in control of the  
9 company, the new owners cannot take back the assets of the trust.

10 The employee is not taxed until receipt of benefits as long as  
11 the trust funds are subject to the claims of the employer's creditors.  
12 The employer is treated as the owner of the funds and taxed on all fund  
13 earnings until the date of distribution.

14 448 F.3d 661, 665 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting David J. Cartano, *Taxation of Compensation & Benefits* §  
15 20.05[D][3], at 735 (2004)).

16 The trust here is no different from the "rabbi trust" discussed in *In re IT Group, Inc.* The  
17 Investors Bank & Trust Company held funds that were out of reach for CLI. The Trust agreement  
18 even acknowledges that:

19 If at any time the Trustee has determined that the Employer is  
20 insolvent, the Trustee shall discontinue payments to Plan participants  
21 or their beneficiaries and shall hold the assets of the Trust for the  
22 benefit of the Employer's general creditors."

23 Trust at section (3)(b) (emphasis added). Consequently, even the plain terms of the Trust Agreement  
24 provide a defining limit to which protection would be provided by the Trust. Read in conjunction  
25 with ERISA, federal law does not afford Plaintiffs any additional protection. The Bankruptcy Court  
26 can easily determine whether a "constructive trust" exists. The basis for any remaining relief is  
27 based on the conduct afterwards of management at CLI, which falls outside the boundaries of  
28 ERISA as the funds were no longer in a rabbi trust (to the extent any additional protection was  
afforded) and rabbi trust trustees under ERISA owe no fiduciary duties as stated in section  
1101(a)(1). The Adversary Proceeding here involves whether the funds are property of the estate, a  
matter routinely addressed by bankruptcy courts.

Finally, to the extent ERISA applies, district courts have routinely allowed the bankruptcy  
courts to hear such matters. See, *Herman v. Steller*, 241 B.R. 206, 210 (E.D. Wisc. 1999) ("Finally,  
case law is rich with precedent that can effectively guide the bankruptcy court in determining the

ERISA issues in the instant action. . . . The court has every confidence in the Bankruptcy Court's ability to effectively read and apply this case law."); *Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Smith Carona Corp.*, 205 B.R. 712 (D. Del. 1996); *In re Quaker City Gear Works, Inc.*, 128 B.R. 711, 714 (E.D. Penn. 1991); *In re White Motor Corp.*, 42 B.R. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1984). These courts have held that mandatory withdrawal is required only when those issues require the interpretation, as opposed to the mere application of the non-title 11 statute. *Herman v. Stetler*, supra, 241 B.R. 206, 210.

Mandatory withdrawal is thus inappropriate. There are no ERISA statutes that require anything more than a straight forward application determining that the Top Hat Plan here is excluded from the substantive provisions of ERISA. The Motion should be denied.

**b. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown Cause for Discretionary Withdrawal.**

Section 157(d) allows for the withdrawal of a case "for cause shown." In determining whether cause exists, the Court shall consider the following: "the efficient use of judicial resources, delay and costs to the parties, uniformity of bankruptcy administration, the prevention of forum shopping, and other related factors." *Security Farms v. International Bhd. of Teamsters*, 124 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting *Orion Pictures v. Showtime Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.)*, 4 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1993)). Further, "[o]ther District Courts in this Circuit have considered additional factors suggested by the Second Circuit, including: whether the claim is core or non-core, whether the claim is legal or equitable; whether the claim is triable by a jury; and conservation of estate and non-debtor resources." *Betta Prod., Inc. v. Distrib. Sys. & Servs., Inc.*, No. 07-2071 SC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45872, \*4-\*5 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2007).

The Adversary Proceeding strikes to the very heart of the Chapter 11 Case; whether the Top Hat Funds are property of the estate.<sup>7</sup> This obviously concerns an issue with which the Bankruptcy Court is very familiar and hears as a matter of course. Plaintiffs raise what are essentially breach of contract claims and theories of constructive trust, which relate to the same basic issue of whether the Top Hat Funds are property of the estate. See, e.g., *In re Union Computer Corp.*, 13 F.3d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing trusts and property of the estate). The Bankruptcy Court is able to

<sup>7</sup> To ensure that whatever decision is binding on all of the participants, the Debtor has filed a Counter-Claim for declaratory relief, naming all plan participants as Counter-Defendants.



1 consider these issues in the course of the Chapter 11 Case and thus promotes judicial efficiency and  
 2 economy. Whether the funds are property of the estate is clearly a core issue under 11 U.S.C. §§  
 3 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (E) and (O). These issues should be resolved in the Bankruptcy Court to  
 4 preserve uniformity in bankruptcy administration. If the Bankruptcy Court determines that the Top  
 5 Hat Funds are property of the estate, further proceedings may be necessary to determine the amount  
 6 of the Plaintiffs' claims, if any, and to the extent, if any, their claims may be subject to a priority  
 7 claim status under § 507(a), are core issues under U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Withdrawal of the  
 8 reference should not "defeat one goal of the bankruptcy court system, which is to have the  
 9 bankruptcy judge hear matters within his area of expertise." *In re General Teamsters*, supra, 1994  
 10 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21620, at \*13 \*14.

11 In keeping with their strategy of ascribing improper motives to the Debtor, Plaintiffs claim  
 12 that "withdrawal of the reference is necessary to preserve the integrity of the District Court orders  
 13 that Defendant...has sought to evade through the commencement of its bankruptcy case." (see  
 14 PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR  
 15 WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE, the "Plaintiffs' Memorandum") at page 2:10-12. Plaintiffs also claim  
 16 that they "should not be forced to re-litigate in Bankruptcy Court the issues that the District Court  
 17 has already heard and determined." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, page 4:12-13.

18 Neither this Court's order imposing a Temporary Protective Order, which in fact was  
 19 stipulated to by the Debtor, nor the Right to Attachment Order, provide any determination of the  
 20 issues alleged in the Adversary Proceeding. This Court's prior orders do not and cannot include any  
 21 binding conclusions of law regarding the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. Indeed, California Code of  
 22 Civil Procedure § 484.100 specifically provides that the Court's issuance of a temporary protective  
 23 order or a right to attach order has no effect on the merits of the claim or defenses.

24 "The court's determinations under this chapter shall have no  
 25 effect on the determination of any issues in the action other than issues  
 26 relevant to proceedings under this chapter nor shall they affect the  
 27 rights of the plaintiff or defendant in any other action arising out of the  
 28 same claim of the plaintiff or defendant. The court's determinations  
 under this chapter shall not be given in evidence nor referred to at the  
trial of any such action."



1 California Code of Civil Procedure § 484.100 (emphasis added).

2 Thus, Plaintiffs' efforts to rely on orders made by this Court on applications requesting  
3 provisional remedies are highly improper. Further, it was clear by the Court's remarks at the various  
4 hearings that the Court was concerned with protecting the Top Hat Funds from the reach of other  
5 creditors prior to a determination of the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims. Far from "evading" these  
6 orders, many of which were agreed to by the Debtor, the filing of the bankruptcy case imposed an  
7 automatic stay stopping all collection efforts of creditors so that the Debtor can orderly liquidate its  
8 assets and distribute them to creditors as provided under the Bankruptcy Code. To the extent  
9 Plaintiffs are arguing that they should not have to re-litigate the issue of segregating these funds  
10 from the reach of other creditors, the parties have already agreed to a stipulation and the Bankruptcy  
11 Court has already issued its order directing the Debtor to segregate the Top Hat Funds in separate  
12 debtor-in-possession accounts, pending further order of the Bankruptcy Court. See REQUEST FOR  
13 JUDICIAL NOTICE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE, Exhibits "A" and  
14 "B" thereto. Whether the Top Hat Funds are property of the estate is a matter for the Bankruptcy  
15 Court to decide.

16 There is no basis to withdraw the reference because of any actions taken in this Court prior to  
17 the filing of the Chapter 11 Case. The matter is properly a matter for the Bankruptcy Court and the  
18 Plaintiffs have offered no compelling reason to this Court to decide otherwise.

#### 19 IV. CONCLUSION

20 For the foregoing reasons, CLI respectfully requests the District Court to deny the Motion.

21 Dated: March 14, 2008

**MURRAY & MURRAY**  
A Professional Corporation

22 By: /s/ Robert A. Franklin  
23 Robert A. Franklin  
24 Attorneys for Debtor, ComUnity Lending,  
25 Incorporated  
26  
27  
28

JOHN WALSH MURRAY (074823)  
 ROBERT A. FRANKLIN (091653)  
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 Email: jlfountain@murraylaw.com

Attorneys for Debtor  
 ComUnity Lending, Incorporated

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN JOSE DIVISION

In re:	)	
	)	
COMUNITY LENDING, INCORPORATED, A	)	Case No. 5:08-CV-00201-JW
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION	)	
	)	Date: April 7, 2008
Debtor.	)	Time: 9:00 a.m.
	)	Place: United States District Court
5671 Santa Teresa Blvd, Suite 201	)	280 S. First Street, Courtroom 8, 4 <sup>th</sup> Flr.
San Jose, CA 95123	)	San Jose, CA 95113
	)	Judge: Honorable James Ware
Employer's Tax ID No.: 94-2673933	)	
	)	

**DECLARATION OF RICHARD G. COUCH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF  
 MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING**

I, Richard G. Couch, declare:

1. I am the Responsible Individual of the Debtor ComUnity Lending, Incorporated (the “Company” or Com Unity”) and am authorized to make this declaration on its behalf. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. If called as a witness, I would and could testify to the following.

2. On January 4, 2008 the Debtor filed its Voluntary Petition under Chapter 11 bearing case number 08-50030 (the “Chapter 11 Case”). The Debtor is a debtor in possession pursuant to

1 sections 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.

2 3. CLI is a mortgage lender incorporated in 1980 and is an S-Corporation owned by W.  
3 Darryl Fry as the sole shareholder. Historically, CLI was in the business of originating, brokering,  
4 servicing and selling residential mortgages. CLI received periodic origination fees for originating  
5 loans and management fees for servicing loans. In addition, CLI obtained and sold real-estate  
6 owned (“REO”) properties acquired through foreclosure upon borrower defaults. At present, CLI  
7 has ceased all loan origination operations and is in the process of selling its remaining loans and  
8 REO properties, completing foreclosures and liquidating all of its other assets.

9 4. As part of its original business, CLI would originate and fund loans via various short  
10 term warehouse lines of credit (the “Warehouse Credit Facilities”) from various financial institutions  
11 including, among others, First Collateral Services, Washington Mutual, Greenwich and GMAC –  
12 RFC. After originating and funding loans, CLI sold substantially all originated and funded loans  
13 (the “Loan Sales”) to various investors, including, among others, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch,  
14 IndyMac and Countrywide Home Loans (collectively, the “Investors”). The Loan Sales enabled the  
15 Company to service the various Warehouse Credit Facilities so that the Debtor could fund additional  
16 loans. Additionally, certain of the Investors would bundle the purchased loans and issue securities,  
17 backed by these loans and mortgages, to private third-party investors. In the event of loan defaults  
18 or delinquencies and/or upon the occurrence of other conditions, subject to the terms of the  
19 applicable Loan Sales’ documents, the Investors could require CLI to repurchase said loans (the  
20 “Repurchase Requests”).

21 5. CLI began to experience the effects of the country-wide mortgage crisis in the spring  
22 of 2007. CLI’s outstanding Repurchase Request obligations continued to increase and peaked in the  
23 July to September 2007 timeframe. This caused a situation whereby CLI could no longer service its  
24 debt. In addition, CLI was served and named in multiple legal actions, including actions by  
25 borrowers, equipment lessors, vendors, and prior employees during the same period. As a result of  
26 the mounting pressures and obligations, CLI was forced to seek a crisis management specialist to  
27 address these issues, fully terminate operations and to liquidate the company. CLI entered into  
28 discussions with Diablo Management Group (“DMG”), of which Richard Couch is the founder and

1 Chairman, to assist in the restructuring, management, and potential liquidation of CLI. On October  
2 25, 2007, the CLI Board of Directors passed a series of resolutions to, among other things, retain  
3 DMG and to appoint Richard Couch as CLI's Chief Executive Officer and board member.  
4 Concurrently therewith, all other officers and directors of CLI resigned and DMG assumed  
5 responsibility for all day to day operations of CLI.

6 6. The Debtor filed the Chapter 11 Case to preserve its remaining assets so that their  
7 value may be maximized by the Debtor for the benefit of all of its creditors. The Debtor intends to  
8 orderly wind down its business, recover and preserve its assets and propose a liquidating plan of  
9 reorganization.

10 7. Plaintiffs are former employees of CLI and participants in the Company's non-  
11 qualified deferred compensation plan (the "Top Hat Plan"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit  
12 "1" to the Plaintiffs' Complaint.

13 8. I am informed and believe that the present Top Hat Plan was commenced in 2001 and  
14 was restated in 2003. It is governed by the terms of the Top Hat Plan and Transamerica Investment  
15 Services served as the plan administrator (the "Plan Administrator"). The Debtor believes that the  
16 plan benefits were held in trust pursuant to a Trust Agreement dated September 1, 2003 ("Trust"), of  
17 which Plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "2" to  
18 Plaintiffs' Complaint.

19 9. Section 1(d) of the Trust states: ". . . Any rights created under the Plan and this Trust  
20 Agreement shall be mere unsecured contractual rights of Plan participants and their beneficiaries  
21 against Employer. Any assets held by the Trust will be subject to the claims of the Employer's  
22 general creditors under federal and state law in the event of Insolvency, as defined in Section 3(a)."  
23 Section 3(a) defined "Insolvency" as the Company being unable to pay its debts as they became due  
24 or the Company becoming a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

25 10. The Top Hat Plan set forth similar language in describing the funds contributed by the  
26 Top Hat Plan participants. Thus, the recitals specify that it is the express intent of the Employer that  
27 the assets of the Plan and Trust shall at all times be subject to the claims of the general creditors of  
28 the Employer.

1           11.     Section 5.2 of the Top Hat Plan provides **that "all amounts under this Plan...shall**  
 2 **remain (until made available to the Participant or Beneficiary) solely the property of the**  
 3 **Employer (without being restricted to the provision of benefits under the Plan) subject to the**  
 4 **claims of the Employer's general creditors. No Participant or Beneficiary shall have any**  
 5 **secured or beneficial interest in any property, rights or investments held by the Employer in**  
 6 **connection with the Plan."**(Emphasis added).

7           12.     Section 10.6 of the Top Hat Plan provides that the "vested **Account balance of a**  
 8 **Participant shall be paid from the Trust only to the extent the Employer is not at the time of**  
 9 **payment insolvent. Any vested accrued benefits under the Plan represent an unfunded,**  
 10 **unsecured promise by the Employer to pay these benefits to the Participants when due. A**  
 11 Participant has no greater right to Trust assets than the general creditors of the Employer in the event  
 12 that the Employer shall become insolvent. Trust assets can be used to pay only vested accrued  
 13 benefits under the Plan or the claims of the Employer's general creditors." (Emphasis added).

14           13.     On or about September 4, 2007, the Company purported to terminate the Top Hat  
 15 Plan. As was apparently normal practice with respect to prior distributions to participants, I am  
 16 informed and believe the Plan Administrator issued checks to ComUnity purportedly in the amount  
 17 of each participant's vested account balance (the "Top Hat Funds"). I am further informed that  
 18 under the normal procedure, the Company would then issue a net check, less applicable withholding  
 19 taxes, to the plan participants, including the Plaintiffs.

20           14.     Following the purported termination of the Plan, and due to the events overtaking the  
 21 Company at this time as described above, the prior management of the Company determined that it  
 22 could not make the distribution of the Top Hat Funds pending a determination of the Company's  
 23 solvency, in light of the Company's then present financial condition. The Company placed all but  
 24 \$227,000 of the Top Hat Funds in a separate, segregated interest bearing account, pending further  
 25 investigation and counsel. DMG has maintained the Top Hat Funds, including the \$227,000 in funds  
 26 referred to above, in two separated segregated accounts since it assumed fiduciary responsibility for  
 27 the Company so that the status quo was maintained pending a resolution.

28     ///

1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing  
2 is true and correct and that this declaration is executed on March 14, 2008.

3  
4 /s/ Richard G. Couch

Richard G. Couch  
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 Email: jlfountain@murraylaw.com

Attorneys for Debtor  
 ComUnity Lending, Incorporated

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN JOSE DIVISION

In re:	)	
	)	
COMUNITY LENDING, INCORPORATED, A	)	Case No. 5:08-CV-00201-JW
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION	)	
	)	Date: April 7, 2008
Debtor.	)	Time: 9:00 a.m.
	)	Place: United States District Court
5671 Santa Teresa Blvd, Suite 201	)	280 S. First Street, Courtroom 8, 4 <sup>th</sup> Flr.
San Jose, CA 95123	)	San Jose, CA 95113
	)	Judge: Honorable James Ware
Employer's Tax ID No.: 94-2673933	)	
	)	

**DECLARATION OF JANENE TOWNER IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING**

I, Janene Towner, declare:

1. I am a former member of the Board of Directors and the former Chief Operating Officer of ComUnity Lending, Incorporated (the “Debtor”, or “Company”). I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. If called as a witness, I would and could testify to the following.

2. My duties as Chief Operating Officer included, among other things, supervision of the Company's human resource activities. From approximately 2002 through August 2007, the

1 Company outsourced its human resource activities to Gevity, Inc.

2 3. In August 2007, the Company's Board of Directors authorized management to  
3 terminate the Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan the Company had established for its  
4 highly compensated employees (the "Top Hat Plan"). Following this decision by the Board, I  
5 conferred with Transamerica Retirement Services, the administrator of the Top Hat Plan (the "Plan  
6 Administrator") with respect to the procedures involved in terminating the Top Hat Plan and  
7 distributing benefits to the participants. On August 29, 2007, I confirmed with Tami Skriver, as the  
8 Plan Administrator's representative, the procedures for termination. It included a written request,  
9 the dissemination of forms for withdrawal of the participants' funds and certain other instructions.

10 4. Pursuant to the Plan Administrator's instruction, the Company notified the  
11 participants of the Top Hat Plan and disseminated Distribution Request forms formulated by the Plan  
12 Administrator to the participants in the Top Hat Plan, including myself. The participants were  
13 instructed to fill out certain information and provide their signature. I reviewed with Ms. Skriver the  
14 procedures required to properly fill out the forms and return them to the Plan Administrator.

15 5. I am advised that the Complaint in this case alleges, among other things, that the  
16 Company "forged" depository instructions on the Distribution Request forms to cause the Plan  
17 Administrator to issue the checks directly to the Company. Attached as **Exhibits "A" and "B"** to  
18 this declaration respectively are true and correct copies (redacted to remove social security  
19 information) of Distribution Request forms submitted by Mai Christina Pham with respect to  
20 distributions under the 2005 Top Hat Plan and 2001 Top Hat Plan. I was informed by the Plan  
21 Administrator that under no circumstances could the Plan Administrator issue checks directly to the  
22 participants, including myself, because the plan assets were general assets of the Company. Instead,  
23 I was advised, and as per the procedure followed in all previous distributions to participants under  
24 the Top Hat Plan, the Plan Administrator was to issue checks to the Company following which the  
25 Company would make the necessary withholding deductions and issue a net check from the  
26 Company's account to the participant. At the Plan Administrator's request, I corrected the  
27 Distribution Requests submitted by some of the participants, including Ms. Pham, to request a check  
28 for payment as opposed to the wire transfer requested by Ms. Pham. I initialed the correction with



1 my initials "JT" in section (c) of the form.

2 6. The Company received checks from Transamerica on account of the distribution  
3 requests made by the participants. These checks were placed in the Company's safe.

4 7. I am informed that the Company sought outside legal advice with respect to the  
5 Company's ability to distribute the funds in light of the Company's then financial situation. I am  
6 further informed that based upon this advice, the Company retained the funds pending further  
7 counsel.

8 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing  
9 is true and correct and that this declaration is executed on March 14, 2008.

10  
11 /s/ Janene Towner  
12 Janene Towner  
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14 Email: jlfountain@murraylaw.com

15 Attorneys for Debtor  
16 ComUnity Lending, Incorporated

17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
18  
19 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN JOSE DIVISION

20 In re:

21 COMUNITY LENDING, INCORPORATED, A  
22 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

23 Debtor.

24 5671 Santa Teresa Blvd, Suite 201  
25 San Jose, CA 95123

26 Employer's Tax ID No.: 94-2673933

27 Case No. 5:08-CV-00201-JW

28 Date: April 7, 2008

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Place: United States District Court  
280 S. First Street, Courtroom 8, 4<sup>th</sup> Flr.  
San Jose, CA 95113

Judge: Honorable James Ware

29 EXHIBIT "A" TO

30 **DECLARATION OF JANENE TOWNER IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF MOTION**  
31 **FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING**

**Distribution Request**  
**Termination of Employment/Retirement**

**Instructions**

To request a distribution, complete all applicable sections of this form, obtain any required signatures, and return the form to Transamerica at the above address. Do not use this form to request a direct rollover to an IRA or an eligible retirement plan; instead complete a Direct Rollover Request (Form No. 2214-TA), or log on to [www.ta-retirement.com](http://www.ta-retirement.com) for forms and information on rolling over your account balance to a Transamerica IRA.

**Section A. Employer Information**

Company/ Employer Name	Com Unity Lending Inc.		
Contract/Account No.	YQ51291	Affiliate No.	02005
		Division No.	

**Section B. Participant Information**

Last Name	PHAM		Date of Birth	
First Name/MI	MAI C		Social Security No.	
Mailing Address				
City			Sta.	
Zip Code				
Phone No./Ext.				
E-mail Address	christina.pham@communitylending.com			

**Section C. Distribution Information**

Reason for distribution: ☒ Termination of employment ☐ Retirement

Amount of distribution: ☒ 100% or ☐ \$ \_\_\_\_\_, remainder to be: ☐ Left on deposit ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_

**Distribution Options**

<input type="checkbox"/> Leave funds on deposit <input type="checkbox"/> Purchase annuity <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lump sum distribution <input type="checkbox"/> Partial distribution <input type="checkbox"/> In-kind distribution of any employer stock (distribution will be in full shares only; partial shares will be paid in cash) <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Deposit Transfer Corp. No. (from new financial institution, so stock can be transferred without issuing certificates)	<input type="checkbox"/> Flexible Distribution Options (available if leaving funds on deposit) <input type="checkbox"/> Fixed Payment \$ _____ (amount) <input type="checkbox"/> Fixed Payment over _____ years <input type="checkbox"/> Life Expectancy <input type="checkbox"/> Single <input type="checkbox"/> Joint (proof of spouse's age required) Payment commencement month: _____ Payment frequency: <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Quarterly <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-Annual <input type="checkbox"/> Annual
---	--

Note: Please refer to your Summary Plan Description or contact your Plan Administrator for more information regarding the distribution options that are available under the plan.

**Payment Options**

☒ Check or ☒ Wire transfer (Complete information below only if wire transfer option is selected. Option available only for lump sum or partial distribution of at least \$5,000. Any distribution less than \$5,000 will be processed in the form of a check.)

ABA No. 1122000247

Institution Name Wells Fargo

Institution Address Westminster Branch

Account Name MAI C. pham

Account No. 0632786349

"Further Credit To" Institution Name \_\_\_\_\_  
(For wire to credit union or overseas bank, call Transamerica for additional information.)

Note: If one of the above payment options is not selected, this distribution will be processed in the form of a check.





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ROBERT A. FRANKLIN (091653)  
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8 Attorneys for Debtor  
9 ComUnity Lending, Incorporated

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
11  
12 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN JOSE DIVISION

13 In re:

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CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

15 Debtor.

16 5671 Santa Teresa Blvd, Suite 201  
San Jose, CA 95123

17 Employer's Tax ID No.: 94-2673933  
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Case No. 5:08-CV-00201-JW

Date: April 7, 2008

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Place: United States District Court  
280 S. First Street, Courtroom 8, 4<sup>th</sup> Flr.  
San Jose, CA 95113

Judge: Honorable James Ware

19 EXHIBIT "B" TO

20 **DECLARATION OF JANENE TOWNER IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF MOTION**  
21 **FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING**  
22  
23  
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**Distribution Request**  
**Termination of Employment/Retirement**

**Instructions**

To request a distribution, complete all applicable sections of this form, obtain any required signatures, and return the form to Transamerica at the above address. Do not use this form to request a direct rollover to an IRA or an eligible retirement plan; instead complete a Direct Rollover Request (Form No. 2214-TA), or log on to [www.ta-retirement.com](http://www.ta-retirement.com) for forms and information on rolling over your account balance to a Transamerica IRA.

**Section A. Employer Information**

Company/ Employer Name	Com Unity Lending Inc.		
Contract/Account No.	YQ51291	Affiliate No.	00001
		Division No.	

**Section B. Participant Information**

Last Name	PHAM	Date of Birth	
First Name/MI	MAI C	Social Security No.	
Mailing Address			
City		State	
Zip Code			
Phone No./Ext.			
E-mail Address	christina.pham@communitylending.com		

**Section C. Distribution Information**

Reason for distribution: ☒ Termination of employment ☐ Retirement

Amount of distribution: ☒ 100% or ☐ \$ \_\_\_\_\_ remainder to be: ☐ Left on deposit ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_

**Distribution Options**

<input type="checkbox"/> Leave funds on deposit <input type="checkbox"/> Purchase annuity <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lump sum distribution <input type="checkbox"/> Partial distribution <input type="checkbox"/> In-kind distribution of any employer stock (distribution will be in full shares only; partial shares will be paid in cash) <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Deposit Transfer Corp. No. (from new financial institution, so stock can be transferred without issuing certificates)	<input type="checkbox"/> Flexible Distribution Options (available if leaving funds on deposit) <input type="checkbox"/> Fixed Payment \$ _____ (amount) <input type="checkbox"/> Fixed Payment over _____ years <input type="checkbox"/> Life Expectancy <input type="checkbox"/> Single <input type="checkbox"/> Joint (proof of spouse's age required) Payment commencement month: _____ Payment frequency: <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Quarterly <input type="checkbox"/> Semi-Annual <input type="checkbox"/> Annual
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Note: Please refer to your Summary Plan Description or contact your Plan Administrator for more information regarding the distribution options that are available under the plan.

**Payment Options**

☒ Check or ☒ Wire transfer (Complete information below only if wire transfer option is selected. Option available only for lump sum or partial distribution of at least \$5,000. Any distribution less than \$5,000 will be processed in the form of a check.)

ABA No. 122000247

Institution Name Wells Fargo

Institution Address Westminster Branch

Account Name MAI C. PHAM

Account No. 0632786349

"Further Credit To" Institution Name \_\_\_\_\_  
(For wire to credit union or overseas bank, call Transamerica for additional information.)

Note: If one of the above payment options is not selected, this distribution will be processed in the form of a check.





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Attorneys for Debtor  
 ComUnity Lending, Incorporated

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN JOSE DIVISION

In re:	)	
	)	
COMUNITY LENDING, INCORPORATED, A	)	Case No. 5:08-CV-00201-JW
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION	)	
	)	Date: April 7, 2008
Debtor.	)	Time: 9:00 a.m.
	)	Place: United States District Court
5671 Santa Teresa Blvd, Suite 201	)	280 S. First Street, Courtroom 8, 4 <sup>th</sup> Flr.
San Jose, CA 95123	)	San Jose, CA 95113
	)	Judge: Honorable James Ware
Employer's Tax ID No.: 94-2673933	)	
	)	

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )  
 ) ss.  
 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA )

I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Santa Clara County. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the above-entitled action; my business address is 19400 Stevens Creek Boulevard, Suite 200, Cupertino, CA 95014-2548.

On March 14, 2008, at my place of business, I served a true and correct copy of the following document(s):

1. **MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING;**



2. **DECLARATION OF RICHARD G. COUCH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN  
OPPOSITION OF MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF ADVERSARY  
PROCEEDING; AND**

3. **DECLARATION OF JANENE TOWNER IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION  
OF MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING.**

in the manner indicated below:

☒ By mail by enclosing said document(s) in an envelope and depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid, addressed as follows:

Ronald S. Kravitz, George H. Kalikman,  
Matthew Borden  
Liner Yankelevitz Sunshine & Regenstreif  
LLP  
199 Fremont Street, 20<sup>th</sup> Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94105-2255

☐ By facsimile transmission sending a true copy of the said document(s) to the person(s) indicated below to the following receiving station(s):

☐ By overnight delivery depositing the said document(s) in a sealed overnight delivery envelope, designated for overnight delivery, with all delivery charges prepaid, with an authorized representative addressed as follows:

☐ By hand delivery personally delivering or arranged to have personally delivered the said document(s) to the person(s) indicated below in a manner provided by law, by leaving the said document(s) at the office(s) or usual place(s) of business, during usual business hours, of the said person(s) with a clerk or other person who was apparently in charge thereof and at least 18 years of age, who was informed of the contents (as indicated):

☐ By e-mail transmission sending a true copy of the said document(s) to the person(s) indicated below:

This Certificate was executed on March 14, 2008 at Cupertino, Santa Clara County, California. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

/s/ Priscilla Teague  
Priscilla Teague